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Abstract Responsibility for climate change lies at the heart of societal debate over
actions to address it. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
established the principle of Bcommon but differentiated responsibilities^ among na-
tions, suggesting that industrialized nations that had produced the greatest share of
historic emissions bore particular responsibility for preventing dangerous interference
with the climate system. But climate responsibilities can be attributed in other ways as
well. Here, we explore the conceptual territory of responsibility. We consider the
distinctive responsibilities of the major investor-owned producers of fossil fuels,
assessing the actions these companies took and could have taken to act upon the
scientific evidence of climate change. We conclude that major investor-owned fossil
energy companies carry significant responsibility for climate change. It is still possible
for these companies to effectively contribute to a solution. Significant progress in
reducing emissions and limiting climate change could be achieved if companies 1)
unequivocally communicate to the public, shareholders, and policymakers the climate
risks resulting from continued use of their products, and therefore the need for
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the 2 °C global temperature
target; 2) firmly reject contrary claims by industry trade associations and lobbying
groups; and, 3) accelerate their transition to the production of low-carbon energy.
Evidence from history strongly suggests that a heightened societal focus on their
climate responsibilities will be needed to hasten such a transition.
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1 Introduction
As the impacts of anthropogenic climate change have become increasingly evident (IPCC
2014), the issue of responsibility for these impacts has come to the fore. The concept of
responsibility is central to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Parties to that convention agreed that
the industrialized nations—which had produced the lion’s share of greenhouse gas emis-
sions—should take the lead in combating climate change Bon the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities^ (United Nations 1992).
The concept of Bdifferentiated^ responsibility signaled the recognition both that industrial-
ized (Annex I) nations had produced most of the emissions, and that their wealth was
intimately linked to the economic activities that produced those emissions (Shue 1999). The
Kyoto Protocol thus focused attention on emission cuts by Annex I nations.
This focus was consistent with the general ethical principle, as well as the common sense of
daily life, that responsibility for a problem is assumed to fall on those who create it, particularly
if they do so knowingly (Rawls 1971). Definitions of responsibility become intricate as people
have divergent interpretations of what exactly the problem is, how to assess its costs, how to
identify the responsible party or parties (particularly if many individuals or groups contribut-
ed), how fully they apprehended the consequences of their actions, and whether reasonable
alternative actions were available to them. In the context of climate change, several competing
views have been put forward about the allocation of responsibilities. The Brazilian Proposal,
for example, analyzed by the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice
(SBSTA), suggested that the burden of addressing climate change should be apportioned on
the basis of cumulative historic emissions (Rive et al. 2006), rather than annual ones, because it
is the former that drive global climate change. Differing allocation schemes dramatically alter
the ranking of the most responsible nations (Fig. 1a–d).
The nation-state framework for climate policymaking via the UNFCCC and scientific
assessment via the IPCC has tended to obscure other ways at looking at the question of
climate responsibility. One option is to focus on individuals. Noting that nations with similar
total emissions (e.g., USA and China) may have very different per capita emissions (Baer et al.
2000), some commentators have proposed the concept of equal per capita allocation over time,
with convergence toward a common per capita emission rate (Höhne et al. 2006). Others have
suggested that the wealthiest individuals in the world, regardless of nationality, should bear a
larger share of the burden (Chakravarty et al. 2009).
Another option is to focus on industry. Recent lawsuits have drawn attention to the
responsibilities of major emitting industries, particularly in transportation and electric power
generation (Osofsky 2012). Shareholder resolutions and calls for institutional and individual
divestment from the primary producers of coal, oil, and natural gas are giving rise to growing
public discourse on the climate responsibilities of these fossil fuels companies (Lubber 2012;
Oreskes 2013; Rockefeller Brothers Fund 2014).
This paper focuses on the distinctive responsibilities of the investor-owned fossil fuel
producers. First, we explore the conceptual territory of responsibility and the historical
evidence that social change has resulted when notions of corporate responsibility have shifted
in response to changing social values. We then present empirical evidence for the role of
specific fossil fuel corporations, including many of the 90 largest industrial carbon producers
whose products are responsible for nearly two-thirds of all known industrial greenhouse gas
emissions since 1751 (Heede 2014). We emphasize that more than half of all industrial
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emissions of carbon dioxide have occurred since 1988: after the establishment of the IPCC,
after leading scientists had stated publicly that anthropogenic climate change was underway,
and after a vigorous and visible public discussion of its causes and risks had begun.
We highlight producers for five reasons. First, a relatively small number of corporations
have produced the fossil energy that has contributed a large proportion of the total historic
emissions that drive disruptive climate change. Second, as major corporations with a high level
of internal scientific and technical expertise, they were aware of and in a position to understand
the available scientific data. Third, an alternative was available to them: they could have
adjusted their business models to anticipate policies motivating a transition to low-carbon
energy by substantially investing in low-carbon energy technologies, constructively engaging
in policy design, and taking other steps to reduce the adverse impact of their products. But they
did not. Even today, they continue to explore for new and increasingly more carbon-polluting
sources of fossil fuels, encouraging the expanded use of the products that they know to be
responsible for disruptive climate change. Fourth, fossil fuel producers, particularly in the
United States but also in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have sought to discredit
and disparage the scientific evidence, and to deny, diminish, or discount the reality and
significance of climate change as a problem (Gelbspan 2005; Ward 2006; Oreskes and
Conway 2010). Many companies lobbied to prevent policies that would encourage the
Fig. 1 Under allocation schemes based on current annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement
production, China leads the pack, followed by the U.S. and India (a). Analysis of current per capita emissions
brings small oil-producing states into the top tier (b). Analysis based on historic emissions (without land use
changes) places the U.S. first, followed the USSR/Russia, China and Germany (c). Including historic land use
changes brings Brazil and Indonesia into the top tier (d). (Boden et al. 2013; Matthews et al. 2014)
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transition to low-carbon energy and continue to do so today, including through the influential
industry trade associations on whose boards of directors many of the largest companies sit
(Wieners 2014).
Finally, we focus on producers because there has been strikingly little attention paid in
academic and policy spheres to their climate responsibilities. Society at large has been unaware
of, or perhaps unwilling to confront, this issue. This paper seeks to open up the question of
their responsibilities to academic and policy analysis.
2 What is responsibility?
The concept of responsibility is central to the question of obligation to act. One familiar notion
of responsibility involves damages: individuals and groups can sue for damages if they believe
another party has injured them. But there are many other ways in which society holds both
individuals and institutions accountable for the consequences of their actions. In the private
sector, shareholders may divest from a corporation that has engaged in inappropriate business
practices or behavior; consumers may decline to buy products. When parties are found
responsible for engaging in illegal activities, they may be subject to governmental sanction,
through restrictions on the sale or marketing of harmful products, civil fines, or criminal
penalties. Ultimately, if consumers, regulators, legislatures, shareholders, or the public at large
disapprove sufficiently of an activity, it may become impossible for a firm to remain in
business, or at least to continue business as usual.
Changing notions of corporate responsibility have played an important role in social change
(Gunningham et al. 2004). The most well-documented example involves tobacco. For decades,
the tobacco industry argued—with considerable success—that responsibility for the ills of
smoking rested with the smoker: individuals made a choice to smoke, and any resulting illness
was their responsibility. However, as the evidence of the harms of tobacco became known, this
argument was increasingly rejected by a society that concluded that manufacturing a product
that killed people, even if legal, was morally problematic. In 1995 the U.S. Department of
Justice concluded that the industry was legally culpable for knowingly spreading disinforma-
tion, bringing charges against the industry under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) act (Eubanks and Glantz 2012).
The story of tobacco is not unique: history is replete with examples of products and
activities that were once accepted but later rejected. Often this shift has hinged on scientific
knowledge. Asbestos for example, was a legal product, viewed by many as a miracle material
that saved lives. But when the scientific evidence became clear that asbestos caused asbestosis
and mesothelioma, both its primary producers and the manufacturers of products containing it
found themselves facing tens of thousands of lawsuits (Bowker 2003; Michaels 2008).
Plaintiffs won many suits, particularly if their exposure occurred after the scientific evidence
of the risks was established (Castleman 2005). The fact that asbestos was a legal product did
not absolve corporations of their responsibility to protect workers and consumers from its
adverse effects. A parallel story has been told about lead. While lead in paint was a legal
product, companies have nevertheless been held liable for the damage it has caused (Marko-
witz and Rosner 2013).
Changing notions of corporate responsibility within civil society gain traction through
shareholder resolutions, consumer boycotts, protests, lawsuits, and media (including social
media) and divestment campaigns; these, in turn, can drive changes in regulation
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(Gunningham et al 2004). Corporations engaged in mining, pulp and paper manufacturing and
the marketing of soy, beef and palm oil have responded to such pressures to go beyond
compliance with legal standards for environmental and social sustainability (Gunningham
et al. 2004; Prno and Slocombe 2012; Nepstad et al. 2014). In effect, these companies have
recognized that they must have a social license to operate.
Turning to fossil fuels, some producers acknowledge that their ability to conduct business
also requires a social license. Royal Dutch Shell, for example, has recently affirmed that Breal
or perceived failures of governance or regulatory compliance could harm our reputation. This
could impact our licence to operate, damage our brand, harm our ability to secure new
resources and limit our ability to access the capital market.^ Shell has also claimed to
embrace the principle of sustainable development, which, they suggest Bis a licence to operate
imperative^ (Royal Dutch Shell plc 2010, 2014). Shell implicitly acknowledges that the
fiduciary requirement of returning value to shareholders does not absolve corporations of
broader ethical responsibilities. History affirms that conclusion. A corporation’s ability to
return value to shareholders is influenced by, and in the long run depends upon, social license.
3 Quantifying the responsibility of industrial carbon producers
An enormous quantity of emissions can be traced to a relatively small number of fossil fuel
producers. Heede (2014) analyzed historic production records of the ninety largest producers
of coal, oil, and natural gas, as well as cement, from 1854 to 2010, calculating the carbon
content of their marketed fuels (subtracting for non-energy uses), process CO2 from cement
manufacturing, CO2 from direct flaring, venting, and fuel use, and fugitive or vented methane.
Of total emissions of industrial CO2 and methane from 1751 to 2010, 63 % were traced to 83
of the world’s largest producers of coal, oil and natural gas, and seven largest manufacturers of
cement. That is to say, only 90 entities have produced all the fossil energy and cement
responsible for 63 % of the world’s industrial emissions of CO2 and methane; 29 % of these
emissions have been traced to just 20 investor and state-owned companies (Fig. 2).
4 Response of industrial carbon producers to the evidence of anthropogenic
climate change
Sustained scientific discussion of anthropogenic climate change can be traced to the 1950s,
with a number of reports in the 1960s and 1970s suggesting that it could become a significant
social and economic problem (NRC 1979; Oreskes 2004; Fleming 2005). In 1988, climate
change went from a prediction to an observation, when NASA scientist James Hansen testified
in the U.S. Congress that the human signal in climate change had been detected (Hansen et al.
1988). Hansen’s testimony was reported on the front page of The New York Times, which
concluded that the Bissue of an overheating world had suddenly moved to the forefront of
public opinion^ (Wilford 1988). Members of the U.S. Congress introduced H.R. 5380, The
National Energy Policy Act of 1988, intended to Bestablish a national energy policy that will
quickly reduce the generation of carbon dioxide and [other] trace gases as quickly as is feasible
in order to slow the pace and degree of atmospheric warming…to protect the global environ-
ment.” Then-Vice President George H.W. Bush ran for president of the United States pledging
to combat the Bgreenhouse effect with the White House effect^ (New York Times Editorial
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Board 1990). 1988 was also the year in which the world nations joined together to create the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide a scientific basis for policy
action. Fossil fuel corporations might have begun to take steps to limit the damages their
products caused to the global environment.
Instead, leading investor-owned fossil fuel corporations, including ExxonMobil, Shell, and
British Petroleum, created the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) to oppose greenhouse gas
emission reduction policies. From 1989 to 2002, the GCC led an aggressive lobbying and
advertising campaign aimed at achieving these goals by sowing doubt about the integrity of the
IPCC and the scientific evidence that heat-trapping emissions from burning fossil fuels drive
global warming. They worked successfully to prevent the United States from signing the
Kyoto Protocol after it was negotiated in 1997. When the GCC disbanded, they stated that they
had achieved their goals (Mooney 2005). A similar pattern of activities was undertaken in the
early 1990s by a group known as the BGreening Earth Society,^ funded by a consortium of
U.S. coal corporations (Oreskes 2010).
An alternative was possible. In 1997, British Petroleum CEO John (later Lord) Browne
gave a major speech at Stanford University pledging to move BP to a new business model that
went Bbeyond petroleum.^ Invoking the scientific consensus on climate change described in
the IPCC Second Assessment report (Houghton et al. 1995), he said:
B[W]e are all citizens of one world, and we must take shared responsibility for its future
and for its sustainable development…[T]here is now an effective consensus among the
world’s leading scientists and serious and well-informed people outside the scientific
community that there is a discernible human influence on the climate and a link between
the concentration of carbon dioxide and the increase in temperature .[I]t would be
unwise and potentially dangerous to ignore the mounting concern. We in BP… alone
Fig. 2 Cumulative emissions from 1854 to 2010 traced to historic fossil fuel production by the largest investor-
owned and state-owned oil, gas, and coal producers, in percent of global industrial CO2 and methane emissions
since 1751. Data source: Heede (2014)
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could not resolve the problem. But that does not mean we should do nothing.…We have
a responsibility to act [and] BP accepts that responsibility…^ (Browne 1997)
Browne’s speech was a major departure from the prevailing industry pattern. The Los
Angeles Times concluded it was akin to the Liggett Group’s acknowledgment earlier that
year that smoking caused cancer and heart disease, the first major tobacco company to do
so (Gerstenzang 1997). It was met with public praise and anticipation of action. The
Financial Times reported that BBP’s stance sets a higher standard against which to judge
other companies’ readiness to cooperate with governments to fight climate change^ (Allen
and Bach 2011).
Following the speech, BP and several other companies took steps in the direction that
Browne envisaged (Kolk and Levy 2001). In 1997, BP became the first company to leave the
Global Climate Coalition; Shell Oil (U.S.) left the following year. In 1998, BP established an
internal cap-and-trade system reducing internal emissions by ten percent over the next 4 years,
and began to invest in solar energy, forming BP Solar in 1999. These measures were touted in
a major advertising campaign launched in 2000 to rebrand BP as BBeyond Petroleum.^ Shell
and Chevron also made targeted investments in renewable energy, totaling as much as 2.5 % of
each company’s annual expenditures during the past decade (Juhasz 2013). In 2007, BP,
ConocoPhillips, and Shell became charter members of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership
(USCAP), a coalition of business and environmental groups seeking to shape U.S. federal
legislation to reduce greenhouse gases. In short, alternative paths were possible, and some
leading companies took initial steps along them.
Responsible climate action by these companies would have extended these initial steps to
broader policies to become diversified energy corporations. This would have included unam-
biguous acceptance of the available scientific evidence demonstrating the role of fossil fuel
production in driving dangerous climate change, encouraging public and corporate support for
policies to avoid dangerous climate change; vigorous and sustained investments in low carbon
energy technologies in anticipation of such policies; education and training for company
employees to understand the reasons for the changes in their business model; and forthright
communication with shareholders, banks and insurers, and the general public to explain their
shift in company strategy.
Responsible action by the fossil energy companies would also have included vigorous
investments to assess the feasibility of carbon capture and storage technologies. The oil
industry had the capability to assess and develop CCS based on their experience since the
1970s in CO2 injection as part of enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and the coal industry had a
strong incentive to develop carbon capture and storage technology, perhaps in cooperation
with coal-burning utilities—at or near sites of coal-fired power plants. By 1988, recognizing
the need to reduce the risks of their products, these industries could have invested in
adapting EOR technologies for the purpose of long-term carbon storage. But they did
not.
5 What did the industrial carbon producers do instead?
The major investor-owned fossil fuel companies did not follow this path. On the contrary, they
took essentially the opposite path, denying the reality of the problem of climate change,
working to ensure that fossil fuels would remain central to global energy production and that
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emissions would continue unabated. Indeed, more than half of all industrial emissions of CO2
since the Industrial Revolution have been emitted since 1988. (Fig. 3).
Browne’s call for corporate responsibility on climate was rejected by the major industrial
carbon producers, and ultimately by BP itself. Instead, many of the largest fossil energy
companies pursued a business model that coupled doubt-mongering about climate science
with political advocacy against carbon regulations and in support of aggressive development
of new sources of fossil fuels. Industry lobbying factored heavily in the 2001 rejection of the
Kyoto Protocol by the U.S. administration under President George W Bush (Vidal 2005) and
in the failure of the U.S. Senate to take up federal climate legislation after a comprehensive cap
on emissions passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 (Mackinder 2010; Grandia
2009; Oreskes 2010). In effect, the industry created a self-fulfilling prophecy: The absence of
carbon regulation would ensure that fossil fuels would continue to be a good investment, and
the companies would maximize profits for their shareholders to the detriment of the world at
large by continuing to expand fossil fuel discovery and development.
Between 1988 and 2005, ExxonMobil invested over $16 million in a network of front
groups that spread misleading claims about climate science (leading to strong public condem-
nation from the British Royal Society: Ward 2006). It also exploited its close relationship with
the administration of President George W. Bush to pressure the administration to remove top
scientists from leadership roles in the IPCC and the US National Climate Assessment and to
promote federal policies driving further reliance on fossil energy (UCS 2007; Brulle 2014). In
2009, Chevron provided transportation for its employees to attend faux BEnergy Citizens’^
rallies organized by the American Petroleum Institute (API), purporting to demonstrate
grassroots opposition to climate policies (Grandia 2009). As of 2010, many of the largest
fossil energy companies were failing to comply with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion guidance to disclose to their shareholders the material risks posed to their business by
climate change (Coburn et al 2012). Several companies, including Chevron and BP, also ran
misleading advertising campaigns highlighting their commitment to renewable energy (Juhasz
2013).
Major fossil fuel companies have maintained leadership roles in influential U.S. trade
associations and lobbying groups, including API, American Coal Council, and the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) that continue to cast doubt on climate science and
Fig. 3 More than half of global CO2 emissions (1751–2014) have been released since 1988. Data sources:
Boden et al. (2013). Le Quéré et al. (2014)
164 Climatic Change (2015) 132:157–171
oppose regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. As of 2012, Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP
America, Shell, ConocoPhillips, Total, Anadarko, Occidental, Hess, Devon, Apache, and
Marathon all served on the Board of Directors of API (American Petroleum Institute 2012).
In 2011 API brought suit with other parties against the EPA over its authority to regulate
greenhouse gases, stating that BEPA professes to be 90 to 99 % certain that ‘anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases are primarily responsible for ‘unusually high planetary tem-
peratures’, but the record does not remotely support this level of certainty^ (Goldman and
Rogerson 2013), a statement that flew in the face of the prevailing scientific consensus (IPCC
2007).
Peabody Energy and ExxonMobil serve on the corporate leadership BEnterprise Council
Bof ALEC, and Chevron, Shell, and ConocoPhillips are members of ALEC’s Energy, Envi-
ronment and Agriculture Task Force. This task force is the source of ALEC’s model legislation
aimed at repealing renewable energy standards and regional climate policy initiatives in US
states. ALEC characterizes climate change on its website as Ba historical phenomenon^ for
which Bthe debate will continue on the significance of natural and anthropogenic
contributions^ (American Legislative Exchange Council 2010, 2014; SourceWatch 2014).
Industrial carbon producers have done all this not only to be able to exploit existing reserves
of oil, gas, and coal, but also to develop new ones. The depletion of older, accessible forms of
oil and gas has led industry to develop new oil fields in technologically difficult and
environmentally risky environments such as the deep Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and
the Arctic. It has also led them to explore for and develop more carbon intensive unconven-
tional fossil resources such as tight oil, with associated increases in emissions from flaring;
thermal enhanced oil recovery, with increased emissions associated with producing steam, and
oil sands, with increased emissions associated with extraction, upgrading and refining (Brandt
et al. 2010). The oil and gas industry has also been dramatically expanding production of
natural gas from shales in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere (Council of Canadian
Academies 2014).
These activities are consistent with the assumption that there will be no substantial
constraints on the production and use of fossil fuels in the near to medium term, and with
the determination to ensure that there will be no such constraints.
If the industrial carbon producers had accepted the need for a substantial price or cap on
carbon, they would have made different business bets. Instead, they engaged in a set of
activities designed to prevent the implementation of any substantial constraint on carbon,
and they did so in part by repeatedly misrepresenting the state of scientific knowledge.
6 What are the industrial carbon producers doing now?
Some fossil fuel companies continue today to reject the scientific evidence—to insist that the
scientific jury is still out—and that their products represent a good solution to the world’s
energy needs. Peabody Energy, for example, declares on its website that Bthe greatest crisis
society confronts is not a future environmental crisis predicted by computer models, but a
human crisis today that is fully within our power to resolve … with coal^ (Peabody Energy
2014).
Other companies are turning to climate science to help them design Bclimate resilient^
measures to maintain and even expand production in the face of hazards posed by thawing
permafrost, rising seas, changing storm patterns, and acidifying oceans (IPIECA 2013). They
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use climate projections to identify new opportunities to exploit fossil resources that are
becoming accessible as a result of melting sea ice and other consequences of global warming.
Royal Dutch Shell’s plans to drill in the Chuckchi Sea, for example, draw explicitly on IPCC
projections for a lengthening period of open water in the Arctic (Skuce 2012).
Other companies claim to accept the core findings of climate science and the serious
risks associated with continued reliance on their products, while acting in ways that belie
that claim. Chevron acknowledges that the use of fossil fuels Bis contributing to an
increase in greenhouse gases … in the Earth’s atmosphere^ and claims to Bshare the
concern of governments and the public about climate change^ (Chevron Corporation
2014). ExxonMobil (2014a) unequivocally declares that Brising greenhouse gas emissions
pose significant risks to society and ecosystems.^ BP (2014) goes even further:
BAccording to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), warming of the
climate system is unequivocal, and is in large part due to an increase in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from human activities.^ Yet, none of these companies has accepted the
proposition that accepting the science and understanding the risks of climate change
implies the need to change their business plans. On the contrary, they argue that the
world needs more fossil fuels rather than less. ExxonMobil (2014b), for example, in its
2014 energy outlook, insists that oil and gas will continue to be our major energy sources
for the foreseeable future; the terms Bclimate change^ or Bglobal warming^ are nowhere
to be found.
BP, Shell, and ExxonMobil have each developed detailed projections of future energy use.
While they differ in their particulars, none anticipates a global price or cap or other strict
regulatory limit on carbon for decades. On the contrary, these companies plan for a future in
which the world will continue to rely on fossil fuels at levels that will lead to highly disruptive
climate impacts. In Energy Outlook: 2035, BP envisions that global CO2 emissions from
energy use will continue to grow on average by 1.1 % per year, bringing emissions in 2035 to
nearly double levels of 1990 and temperatures towards or above 4 °C by the end of the century,
by their own admission Bwell above the path recommended by scientists…^ (BP 2014). Shell
explicitly acknowledges that the energy futures they envision will have highly disruptive
consequences, Bovershoot[ing] the trajectory for a 2 °C goal^ (Royal Dutch Shell plc 2013).
Yet, knowing this, they continue to bank on a high carbon future (Fig. 4).
Industry projections of future emissions that bring atmospheric carbon dioxide levels to
concentrations well in excess of safe limits may turn out to be correct. But if so this will be in
no small part because of the intensive efforts that industrial carbon producers have made—and
continue to make—to prevent meaningful regulation of their products. The fossil fuel industry
is knowingly participating in a pathway by which, in the words of Shell CEO Ben van
Beurden, climate change Bis just going to happen whether we like it or not^ (Mufson 2014).
They are actively creating the future that they claim to accept the need to avoid.
7 Conclusion
The analysis presented here suggests that the world’s largest investor-owned fossil energy
producers bear substantial responsibility for anthropogenic climate change. This is because:
1) They have produced a large share of the products responsible for dangerous anthropo-
genic interference in the climate system;
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2) They continued to produce them well after the danger was scientifically established and
recognized by international policymakers;
3) They have worked systematically to prevent the political action that might have stabilized
or reduced GHG emissions, including through unethical practices such as promoting
disinformation; and
4) While ostensibly acknowledging the threat represented by unabated reliance on fossil
fuels, they nevertheless continue to engage in business practices that will lead to their
expanded production and use for decades to come.
The major investor-owned fossil energy producers companies have done all of this even
while an alternative vision had been articulated and was possible. Through their actions, they
have not only invested in, but sought to guarantee, a future that serves the interests of their
shareholders, employees, and executives, but threatens the health, well-being and prosperity of
virtually everyone else. Their power and influence on the global response to climate change is
substantial. The fact that others—governments, emitting industries, and individuals—have
responsibilities, too, does not obviate this point.
Much time has been lost since 1988, when an orderly transition to clean energy could and
should have begun. Yet, it still may be possible for fossil fuel companies to make a transition
Fig. 4 Historic and projected global CO2 emissions. Historic emissions from Boden et al (2013). Projected
emissions through 2035 from Royal Dutch Shell plc (2013), International Energy Agency (2013), BP (2014) and
ExxonMobil (2014a, b). BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell project a continued high reliance on fossil energy, well
above the pathway (IEA 450) that would result in a 50 % probability of keeping global temperatures below the
2 °C policy target. Shell’s BOceans^ scenario is one in which energy choices are shaped primarily by market
forces, their BMountains^ scenario is one in which government policies play a more dominant role. IEA Bcurrent
policies^ scenario assumes policies and measures in place as of 2013; Bnew policies^ scenario assumes additional
policies and measures announced by governments but not fully enacted
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over the next two decades into energy companies that produce clean, low carbon energy at
reasonable cost and reasonable profit.
It would be folly to assume that these companies will make such a transition of their own
accord or in anticipation of the swift enactment of carbon regulations that they continue to
thwart. Rather, evidence from history strongly suggests that a greatly intensified societal focus
on their climate responsibilities will be needed to hasten it. Past shareholder actions, divest-
ment campaigns, consumer boycotts of corporate Bbad actors,^ and litigation have proven
effective in changing corporate behavior. Recently, public and shareholder pressure has helped
drive BP America’s decision to stop funding the American Legislative Exchange Council
(Page 2015), and BP and Royal Dutch Shell’s adoption of shareholder resolutions requiring
them to report annually on their low-carbon energy research and development investments and
their positions on climate policies (Farrell 2015).
These are modest first steps for companies whose core business model assumes and
encourages our long-term reliance on fossil energy. But they are indicative of the potential
for heightened civil society engagement to drive further change in company behavior.
We should make clear that these companies operate with a social license, and consider ways
to revoke that license for carbon producers who fail to act on their social responsibility.
We should expect, for example, that companies stop supporting disinformation on climate
change, including through lobbying groups and trade associations; unequivocally encourage
and support state, federal, and international policies consistent with keeping warming below
the 2 °C global temperature target; transparently report on and increase their investments in
low carbon energy technologies and carbon capture and storage; and fully disclose the
financial and physical risks of climate change to their business operations. And we should
expect fossil fuel corporations to pay for a share of the harms resulting from the use of their
products, both for the damages that have already occurred and the costs of preparing to limit
the damages from further, now unavoidable impacts that responsible actions by these compa-
nies could have, and should have, helped to avoid.
The world’s essential transition to low carbon energy may hinge upon the scale and success
of such efforts.
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